---
summary: "Canonical credential eligibility and resolution semantics for auth profiles"
title: "Auth credential semantics"
read_when:
  - Working on auth profile resolution or credential routing
  - Debugging model auth failures or profile order
---

These semantics keep selection-time and runtime auth behavior aligned. They are shared by:

- `resolveAuthProfileOrder` (profile ordering)
- `resolveApiKeyForProfile` (runtime credential resolution)
- `openclaw models status --probe`
- `openclaw doctor` auth checks (`doctor-auth`)

## Stable probe reason codes

Probe results carry a `status` bucket (`ok`, `auth`, `rate_limit`, `billing`, `timeout`, `format`, `unknown`, `no_model`) plus a stable `reasonCode` when the probe never reached a model call:

| `reasonCode`             | Meaning                                                                      |
| ------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `excluded_by_auth_order` | Profile omitted from the explicit auth order for its provider.               |
| `missing_credential`     | No inline credential or SecretRef is configured.                             |
| `expired`                | Token `expires` is in the past.                                              |
| `invalid_expires`        | `expires` is not a valid positive Unix ms timestamp.                         |
| `unresolved_ref`         | Configured SecretRef could not be resolved.                                  |
| `ineligible_profile`     | Profile is incompatible with provider config (includes malformed key input). |
| `no_model`               | Credentials exist but no probeable model candidate resolved.                 |

Eligibility checks report `ok` as the reason code for usable credentials.

## Token credentials

Token credentials (`type: "token"`) support inline `token` and/or `tokenRef`.

### Eligibility rules

1. A token profile is ineligible when both `token` and `tokenRef` are absent (`missing_credential`).
2. `expires` is optional. When present it must be a finite number of Unix epoch milliseconds greater than `0` and no larger than the maximum JavaScript `Date` timestamp (8640000000000000).
3. If `expires` is invalid (wrong type, `NaN`, `0`, negative, non-finite, or beyond that maximum), the profile is ineligible with `invalid_expires`.
4. If `expires` is in the past, the profile is ineligible with `expired`.
5. `tokenRef` does not bypass `expires` validation.

### Resolution rules

1. Resolver semantics match eligibility semantics for `expires`.
2. For eligible profiles, token material may be resolved from the inline value or `tokenRef`.
3. Unresolvable refs produce `unresolved_ref` in `models status --probe` output.

## Setup replacements

Setup replacement credentials are saved under separate profile IDs with an
internal `setup` descriptor in the existing credential payload. They cannot
enter normal rotation, resolve through an explicit profile pin, or be copied to
another agent. Only the owning setup operation can test the selected credential.
After one successful tool-free turn, setup asks whether to activate it. Declining
or failing the test keeps the saved credential inactive and preserves the current
connection. Model Setup offers the same saved sign-in for a fresh test without
another login. Gateway activation waits for config application; a required restart
keeps the replacement inactive until setup is retried. Ordinary login remains
immediate. The descriptor retains the selected model and connection settings for retry after
restart, without caching a verification result. This adds no database schema or
migration; older runtimes do not enforce the inactive state. Before downgrading,
remove saved inactive replacements or restore the state from before setup.

Noninteractive setup saves replacement credentials for later activation in Model
Setup and leaves the current connection unchanged. Reusing an existing credential
and first-run noninteractive setup retain their existing behavior.

## Agent copy portability

Agent auth inheritance is read-through. When an agent has no local profile, it resolves profiles from the shared auth store at runtime without copying secret material into its own credential store (`agents/<agentId>/agent/openclaw-agent.sqlite`). The shared store lives in `state/openclaw.sqlite` after `openclaw doctor --fix` performs the one-time relocation. Until then, doctor reports the legacy `agents/main/agent/openclaw-agent.sqlite` owner and leaves that agent undeletable.

Explicit copy flows, such as `openclaw agents add`, use this portability policy:

- `api_key` and `token` profiles are portable unless `copyToAgents: false`.
- `oauth` profiles are not portable by default because refresh tokens can be single-use or rotation-sensitive.
- Provider-owned OAuth flows may opt in with `copyToAgents: true` only when copying refresh material across agents is known safe; the opt-in only applies when the profile carries inline access/refresh material.

Non-portable profiles remain available through the shared read-through base unless the target agent signs in separately and creates its own local profile.

During OAuth refresh, the current credential generation is replaced by an inert
durable marker. Pending markers remain ineligible by default and are ordered only
by runtime paths that immediately pass them to the settlement-aware resolver.
Failed markers are terminal and require the operator to authenticate again.

Agent-local peers never receive copied rotated refresh material. A peer removes
its marker and inherits the shared credential only after verifying that the
shared credential belongs to the same account. If that identity cannot be
verified, the peer remains terminally fenced instead of inheriting another
account.

## Plugin SDK OAuth validation

`resolveApiKeyForProfile`, exported from `openclaw/plugin-sdk/agent-runtime`,
accepts an optional `validateOAuthCredential` callback. The resolver calls it
before returning an OAuth credential and before persisting or adopting a
refreshed credential. The callback also applies when a legacy
`provider:default` profile falls back to a replacement OAuth profile.

Throwing from the callback rejects that credential. A rejected fallback is not
returned or refreshed, and the original selected-profile refresh failure remains
the operator-facing error. Rejecting an active refresh or settlement generation
fails closed and can leave that generation and its peers terminally fenced, so
the operator must authenticate again. Callers that omit the callback retain the
existing resolution and fallback behavior.

`openclaw agent exec` preserves the original shared-store root when switching to temporary run state. Its bounded credential scope reads portable `api_key` and `token` profiles from that shared store without persisting copies; the configured agent's local profiles still win. Shared OAuth profiles are excluded from this temporary scope, even with `copyToAgents: true`, so the run does not acquire another refresh owner. `--auth-env-only` disables stored credential access entirely.

Auth writes that explicitly select a state directory, including isolated QA staging, use that directory's shared store for ownership and OAuth deduplication. Their runtime publication and rollback retain the same owner; another process-local state root is not an inherited base. An unrelated outer database may be older, newer, or unreadable without blocking an isolated write, but an unreadable or newer database in the selected target still fails closed. Writes without an explicit state directory retain the normal ambient state and agent-directory configuration.

## Personal model accounts

Accounts connected from **Settings → Profile → Connected accounts** have an identity-scoped owner in the shared state database. Their credentials and usage state never enter shared or agent-local auth stores, external CLI mirrors, or global runtime snapshots. A runtime loads at most the one personal credential selected by its session. Unlinked personal accounts remain usable by existing session pins, not by automatic selection for new sessions.

Personal pins keep the existing same-provider failover policy: ordered shared accounts can be tried after a pinned account fails. They do not make another person's personal account a fallback. Reconnecting can replace only the connecting person's own credential; shared credentials referenced by an administrator-created link are not personal property. See [Per-person model accounts](/concepts/multi-user#per-person-model-accounts).

## Config-only auth routes

`auth.profiles` entries with `mode: "aws-sdk"` are routing metadata, not stored credentials. They are valid when the target provider uses `models.providers.<id>.auth: "aws-sdk"`, the route the plugin-owned Amazon Bedrock setup writes. These profile ids may appear in `auth.order` and session overrides even when no matching entry exists in the credential store.

Do not write `type: "aws-sdk"` into the credential store; stored credentials are only `api_key`, `token`, or `oauth`. If a legacy `auth-profiles.json` has such a marker, `openclaw doctor --fix` moves it to `auth.profiles` and removes the marker from the store.

When a selected stored profile is removed, credential-scoped model discovery reports `selected_auth_profile_unavailable` before consulting dynamic model metadata. Restore the credential or select another configured profile; registering the model does not repair missing authentication. Config-only AWS SDK profiles remain valid without a stored credential. Chat admission and agent commands retain an explicit same-provider selection when its credential disappears so authentication can report recovery. Stale automatic selections and selections for incompatible providers are still cleared.

## Explicit auth order filtering

- When `auth.order.<provider>` or the auth-store order override is set for a provider, `models status --probe` only probes profile ids that remain in the resolved auth order for that provider. The stored override wins over `auth.order` config.
- A stored profile for that provider that is omitted from the explicit order is not silently tried later. Probe output reports it with `reasonCode: excluded_by_auth_order` and the detail `Excluded by auth.order for this provider.`
- A valid session user pin is an explicit per-session exception: OpenClaw tries that profile first even when it is omitted from the provider order, then uses the ordered same-provider profiles as retry candidates. A cooldown or disabled window applies only to the affected profile; it does not suppress its eligible siblings.

Prepared agent requests use their selected plugin metadata, configuration, workspace, and environment for auth profile eligibility, ordering, and environment credential evidence. An empty selected plugin set remains authoritative; another request’s plugin aliases cannot add profiles or change the credential owner.

## Model catalog discovery

Stored-profile selection for model discovery follows the canonical auth order and
eligibility rules. A cooldown limited to one model does not suppress account-wide
catalog discovery. Configured subscription modes remain attached to direct
credentials, and successful OAuth preparation supplies the resolved current token
to its catalog consumer rather than the captured store's older token.

Environment-backed profiles keep usable values from the discovery environment,
including cold command and worker paths. When that material is missing, only the
selected profile's activated snapshot may supply it; otherwise discovery reports
`unavailable` before catalog HTTP. Reference names are never sent as credentials
or replaced with another profile's credential. On a Gateway, restore the secret
and run `openclaw secrets reload` before retrying discovery.

When every eligible OAuth candidate fails preparation, discovery reports
`unavailable` with the attempted profile identities instead of treating the
provider as unconfigured. Compatible prior inventory remains available. A usable
fallback credential still supplies its own catalog result.

When a catalog deadline expires, late provider results are discarded before
finalization. An already-started hook or OAuth refresh may finish, including
persisting a rotated credential, but cannot publish to the expired catalog run.

API-key-oriented and full-auth catalog callbacks retain their existing source
priorities. Plugins must keep credential bytes and their authentication mode from
the same selection. Catalog failure and recovery preserve the
[model inventory contract](/concepts/models#selection-source-and-fallback-strictness);
they do not change message-execution profile rotation or session pins.

## Probe target resolution

- Probe targets can come from auth profiles, environment credentials, or `models.json` (result `source`: `profile`, `env`, `models.json`).
- If a provider has credentials but OpenClaw cannot resolve a probeable model candidate for it, `models status --probe` reports `status: no_model` with `reasonCode: no_model`.

## External CLI credential discovery

- Supported external CLI credentials are discovered only when the provider, runtime, or auth profile is in scope for the current operation, or when a stored local profile for that external source already exists.
- Auth-store callers choose an explicit external-CLI discovery mode: `none` for persisted/plugin auth only, `existing` for refreshing already stored external CLI profiles, or `scoped` for a concrete provider/profile set.
- Read-only/status paths pass `allowKeychainPrompt: false`; they use file-backed external CLI credentials only and do not read or reuse macOS Keychain results.
- `/models` reuses external login evidence already prepared with its catalog, so those providers remain visible without a second OpenClaw login. Opening the default menu does not repeat external CLI discovery; explicit auth order and route compatibility still apply.

Codex owns its native login. Ordinary status and model reads do not import its
credentials into OpenClaw profiles. To retain a configured CLI-backed
`openai:default` profile, explicitly import the current Codex login with
`openclaw models auth login --provider openai --method device-code`. When that
OAuth profile is declared in `auth.profiles`, the source is the current native
Codex home, and no other managed OpenAI OAuth profile exists, import preserves
the profile ID and its existing model and session pins. The configured model
and native credential file stay unchanged. An explicitly isolated agent home
continues to use the imported OpenClaw profile through its isolated runtime.

Fresh imports keep account-scoped profile IDs. A matching existing account and
user reuse their stored profile. Import from another home, missing account/user
identity, or an existing managed account does not claim the legacy pin. Use the
reported imported profile explicitly in those cases. Source changes and
conflicting profiles detected before persistence stop only the selected import.

## OAuth SecretRef Policy Guard

SecretRef input is for static credentials only. OAuth credentials are runtime-mutable (refresh flows persist rotated tokens), so SecretRef-backed OAuth material would split mutable state across stores.

- If a profile credential is `type: "oauth"`, SecretRef objects are rejected for any credential material field on that profile.
- If `auth.profiles.<id>.mode` is `"oauth"`, SecretRef-backed `keyRef`/`tokenRef` input for that profile is rejected.
- Violations are hard failures (thrown errors) in startup/reload secret preparation and profile resolution paths.

## Legacy-Compatible Messaging

When an empty SQLite auth store has a retired `auth-profiles.json` beside it,
runtime inspects provider metadata without importing or resolving its credentials.
`AUTH_PROFILE_MIGRATION_REQUIRED` blocks only those providers, including their auth
aliases; unrelated provider auth remains available. Unreadable or unrecognized
legacy data retains the owner-wide refusal. A populated SQLite store retains its
warning-only behavior. Recorded refusals remain until the lifecycle explicitly
clears them; changing or removing a legacy file does not release them. Doctor lists the affected providers, and
`openclaw doctor --fix` performs the supported verified import and archive.

Session readers retain their local and shared auth-store owners and check each
owner's current refusal before returning credentials. A shared-provider refusal
does not replace an unrelated local credential with environment or config auth,
and unresolved local SecretRefs still fail closed. Only recognized credential
entries can narrow a legacy refusal; metadata-only objects and unknown layouts
remain owner-wide.

Credential writes check migration readiness owner-wide for their destination
database only. A shared-store refusal does not block refreshing an unrelated
agent-local OAuth credential; a refusal on the write destination still blocks it.

Session migration guards use the same pinned runtime config as model discovery
and the requested model's endpoint to resolve endpoint-dependent provider aliases.
Prepared session views retain canonical profiles from both owners and validate
their SecretRefs; migration metadata does not filter these profiles. The
endpoint-aware request guards decide admission. Each selected credential also
retains its physical source owner through merges and async resolution. A refusal
held by that owner continues to fence matching credentials imported by another
process until an explicit lifecycle clear/reload. The other owner's credentials
remain independent. This provenance is runtime-only and is never stored in SQLite.
If the requested provider needs
an endpoint to identify its credential realm and that context is missing, any
pending migration refusal blocks it. An explicitly configured unrelated endpoint
remains usable.

For script compatibility, probe errors keep this first line unchanged:

`Auth profile credentials are missing or expired.`

Human-friendly detail and the stable reason code follow on subsequent lines in the form `↳ Auth reason [code]: ...`.

## Related

- [Secrets management](/gateway/secrets)
- [Auth storage](/concepts/oauth)
- [SecretRef credential surface](/reference/secretref-credential-surface) - which credential fields accept a SecretRef instead of a raw secret value